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ABSTRACT—American immigration law mandates the civil detention of 
certain classes of migrants while their legal cases proceed through the courts. 
Due to the peculiar nature of immigration law, many migrants find 
themselves detained for years on end without receiving the level of due 
process that normally attends imprisonment. This Note draws on historical 
and comparative analysis to argue that the mandatory detention provisions 
of American immigration law are not civil, but functionally criminal, and 
that detained migrants are therefore owed a modicum of due process that 
they do not currently receive. 
This Note traces the history of immigration law in the United States, 
surveying the laws and cases that gave rise to the mandatory civil detention 
of certain classes of migrants. This Note then examines recent Supreme 
Court cases challenging these provisions. Analogizing migrant detention to 
debtors’ prisons in early modern England and involuntary civil commitment 
in the substance abuse crisis, this Note identifies four features that help 
discern civil from criminal detention. Finally, this Note applies those four 
features to the mandatory detention of migrants under the Immigration and 
Nationality Act, concluding that this detention is functionally criminal 
imprisonment, demanding greater due process for migrants. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In the spring of 1948, Ignatz Mezei decided to visit his dying mother. 
He left his home in Buffalo and set sail for Europe to care for her.1 Mr. Mezei 
had lived in upstate New York for a quarter century.2 During World War II, 
Mr. Mezei exercised his civic duty on behalf of the United States, 
volunteering his time and energy to help the American war effort. He worked 
for the U.S. Coast Guard, served as an air raid warden, donated blood, and 
sold war bonds.3 But after the war, he experienced great difficulty in 
navigating postwar Europe, and found himself unable to enter Romania to 
visit his dying mother. So, Mr. Mezei secured an immigration quota visa 
from the American consulate in Budapest and sailed back to the United 
States to return to his wife and home.4 
Upon his arrival at Ellis Island, immigration inspectors told a very 
different story. In their eyes, Mr. Mezei was not a civic-minded, star-
spangled Buffalo resident, but a stranger of mysterious origin, ostensibly 
 
 1 Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 216 (1953) (Black, J., dissenting); United 
States ex rel. Mezei v. Shaughnessy, 101 F. Supp. 66, 67 (S.D.N.Y. 1951), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 
195 F.2d 964 (2d Cir. 1952), rev’d, 345 U.S. 206 (1953). 
 2 Mezei, 345 U.S. at 216. 
 3 Shaughnessy, 101 F. Supp. at 67. 
 4 Mezei, 345 U.S. at 208. 
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born in Gibraltar to parents of Romanian or Hungarian descent.5 They 
accused him of having joined a communist cell that operated under the 
direction of the Communist Party when he first came to the United States in 
1924.6 They claimed that he harbored communist sympathies and served as 
the secretary and president of the Buffalo chapter of the communist 
propaganda machine.7 The Supreme Court characterized his trip to Europe 
as a curious disappearance behind the Iron Curtain.8 The Attorney General 
determined that Mr. Mezei’s release into the United States after returning 
from Europe would be prejudicial to the public interest, and ordered his 
exclusion from the country.9 Mr. Mezei was promptly detained in the 
Communist Ward at Ellis Island until the government could effectuate his 
departure.10 
After his final order of removal, Mr. Mezei tried—and failed—to depart 
Ellis Island for another country. He applied for admission to over a dozen 
European, Latin American, and South American countries. Every country 
refused his application.11 Mezei was “likely to be detained indefinitely, 
perhaps for life, for a cause known only to the Attorney General.”12 
Later courts have read Mezei as a command of judicial deference in 
cases where a noncitizen is subjected to indefinite civil detention when trying 
to enter the United States.13 Just as Mr. Mezei was condemned to languish in 
 
 5 Id. 
 6 Charles D. Weisselberg, The Exclusion and Detention of Aliens: Lessons from the Lives of Ellen 
Knauff and Ignatz Mezei, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 933, 972–73 (1995). 
 7 Id. at 974–75. 
 8 Mezei, 345 U.S. at 214. 
 9 Id. at 208. 
 10 Weisselberg, supra note 6, at 971. 
 11 Mezei, 345 U.S. at 219–20 (Jackson, J., dissenting). Justice Jackson remarked that since the United 
States had adjudged Mezei a “Samson who might pull down the pillars of our temple,” it is not surprising 
that other, “less strongly established and less stable” countries would refuse to admit him. Id. at 220. 
 12 Id. at 220. After nearly four years of detention, the government quietly released him as it closed 
down Ellis Island. Richard A. Serrano, Detained, Without Details, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 1, 2003, 12:00 AM), 
https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2003-nov-01-na-ignatz1-story.html [https://perma.cc/4HEU-
ZNWF]. 
 13 See, e.g., Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 705 (2001) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (finding that the 
holding of Mezei should be expanded to control cases involving noncitizens who are firmly within the 
territory of the United States and wish to remain); Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977) (citing Mezei 
in stating that Congress’s legislative power is at its height when determining the admissibility of 
noncitizens); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 765–66 (1972) (citing Mezei in noting that the 
“Court’s general reaffirmations of this principle [of judicial deference to Congress and the President in 
the immigration context] have been legion”). In a recent Third Circuit case involving families seeking to 
avoid expedited removal from the United States, the court held that Mezei controlled. Castro v. U.S. Dep’t 
of Homeland Sec., 835 F.3d 422, 443 (3d Cir. 2016). Notably, this case traced the arc of the Supreme 
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an Ellis Island jail cell for the rest of his life, migrants today can be subjected 
to indefinite civil detention for years at a time, all without being able to see 
a judge to contest their detention.14 
This Note focuses on the permissiveness of indefinite civil detention in 
American immigration law. It draws on analogies to early modern English 
debtors’ prisons and involuntary civil commitment in the substance abuse 
crisis to argue that the Supreme Court should recognize that indefinite civil 
detention under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) is not actually 
civil—it is functionally criminal. 
Indefinite civil detention, and the accompanying human toll, continues 
through to today.15 Hours before taking the stage in Orlando, Florida for the 
official kickoff of his reelection campaign,16 President Trump took to Twitter 
to ignite debate on his signature issue of immigration. The President unveiled 
a major deportation operation, announcing that “[n]ext week, ICE 
[Immigrations and Customs Enforcement] will begin the process of 
removing the millions of illegal aliens17 who have illicitly found their way 
into the United States.” 18 The announcement blindsided senior ICE 
 
Court’s plenary power cases, finding that Mezei rolled back earlier cases that were friendlier to 
noncitizens. Id. 
 14 See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(b), 1226(a), 1226(c) (2012); see also Kelsey Lutz, The Implications of 
Jennings v. Rodriguez on Immigration Detention Policy, MINN. L. REV. BLOG (Feb. 4, 2019), 
https://minnesotalawreview.org/2019/02/04/the-implications-of-jennings-v-rodriguez-on-immigration-
detention-policy/ [https://perma.cc/8XJK-GAX5] (“[T]housands of [noncitizens] each year [are] detained 
pursuant to a series of immigration statutes requiring mandatory detention . . . .”); Domenico Montanaro 
et al., Supreme Court Ruling Means Immigrants Could Continue to Be Detained Indefinitely, NPR (Feb. 
27, 2018, 10:24 AM), https://www.npr.org/2018/02/27/589096901/supreme-court-ruling-means-
immigrants-can-continue-to-be-detained-indefinitely [https://perma.cc/ZN3H-FN7B] (“The U.S. 
Supreme Court ruled . . . that immigrants, even those with permanent legal status and asylum seekers, do 
not have the right to periodic bond hearings.”). 
 15 Albeit without the intrigue and espionage that colored the facts of Mezei. 
 16 Maggie Haberman et al., Trump, at Rally in Florida, Kicks Off His 2020 Re-election Bid, N.Y. 
TIMES (June 18, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/18/us/politics/donald-trump-rally-
orlando.html [https://perma.cc/AJ7E-ANNH]. 
 17 The terms used to describe noncitizens vary widely and can be politically charged. When quoting 
or discussing a source, this Note will use whatever term is supplied in the source material. When 
discussing the issue more generally, this Note will use the terms “noncitizen” or “migrant.” 
 18 Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (June 17, 2019, 6:20 PM), 
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1140791400658870274 [https://perma.cc/5VCZ-TYQX]. 
Days later, President Trump delayed the operation for two weeks, announcing that the operation would 
go forward barring legislative overhaul from Congress. Christian Vasquez, Trump Delays ICE 
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officials19 and enraged congressional Democrats.20 Most importantly, it put 
immigrants in a state of fear, racing to understand their rights and what might 
happen to them.21 
Many immigrants fear civil detention, the deprivation of liberty for 
noncriminal purposes.22 Individuals held in civil detention may never have 
been charged with a crime.23 Civil detainees are held in facilities that are 
often indistinguishable from criminal detention centers.24 Civil detention is 
a central feature of American immigration law,25 used as a means of 
effectuating the removal of immigrants or maintaining custody of 
immigrants pending court actions.26 
The same week President Trump announced the ICE operation, news 
articles detailing the wretched conditions of immigration detention centers 
drew public attention. Harrowing accounts of these centers detailed the ways 
in which those detained were denied basic human necessities. Children were 
 
 19 Zolan Kanno-Youngs & Michael D. Shear, ICE Signals Mass Immigration Arrests, but Not the 
‘Millions’ Trump Promised, N.Y. TIMES (June 18, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/18/ 
us/politics/trump-immigration-deportations.html?module=inline [https://perma.cc/TLC2-SQCG]. 
 20 Vasquez, supra note 18. 
 21 After news of the raids broke, the ACLU and the Refugee and Immigrant Center for Education 
and Legal Services published posts on social media aimed at informing immigrants of their rights should 
they be approached or detained by immigration officials. Aaron Rupar et al., Trump Postpones ICE’s 
Planned Deportation Raids in 10 Big Cities, VOX (June 23, 2019, 8:54 AM), 
https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2019/6/21/18701408/ice-deportation-raids-10-cities 
[https://perma.cc/4YUP-9VU2]. 
 22 Emily Ryo, Essay, Detention as Deterrence, 71 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 237, 238 (2019) 
(“Immigration detention in the U.S. is civil confinement for which the officially stated purpose is to 
facilitate the removal of individuals who do not have permission to remain in the country.”); see also Anil 
Kalhan, Rethinking Immigration Detention, 110 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 42, 44 (2010) (discussing the 
use of civil detention as a means of depriving an individual of liberty for the noncriminal purpose of 
effectuating the individual’s removal). 
 23 Many noncitizens detained under the mandatory detention provisions have never been charged 
with a crime. Lutz, supra note 14 (noting that the categories of noncitizens detained under these statutes 
include not only the criminally charged but also asylum seekers and noncitizens initially determined to 
be inadmissible). 
 24 Kalhan, supra note 22, at 50 (“Most detention facilities . . . were designed to hold criminal suspects 
and offenders, not immigration detainees, and most detention officials have experience in law 
enforcement, not civil detention and alternatives to detention.”). See generally Megan Shields Casturo, 
Comment, Civil Immigration Detention: When Civil Detention Turns Carceral, 122 PENN ST. L. REV. 
825, 833–36 (2018) (surveying the dire conditions of privately owned detention centers, which house a 
majority of ICE detainees). 
 25 Laurence Benenson, The Math of Immigration Detention, 2018 Update: Costs Continue to 
Multiply, NAT’L IMMIGR. F. (May 9, 2018), https://immigrationforum.org/article/math-immigration-
detention-2018-update-costs-continue-mulitply/ [https://perma.cc/VJ6K-TTK8]; see also Ryo, supra 
note 22, at 239 (“The Trump Administration has expanded immigration detention by subjecting a greater 
number of individuals to detention and by making it more likely that detention will be prolonged.”). 
 26 See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(b), 1226(c) (2012). 
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denied toothbrushes, toothpaste, and soap.27 In one Texas center, the 
overwhelming majority did not have the opportunity to bathe for long 
periods of time after entering the United States.28 Toddlers without diapers 
were left with no option but to relieve themselves in their pants.29 
While lawyers and district court judges have grappled over the 
conditions in these centers,30 the Supreme Court is wrestling with broader 
questions on the issue of civil detention: What does the Constitution permit? 
Who may be detained in civil detention, and for how long? How do we 
understand the rights of immigrants and the permissiveness of civil 
detention? With recent decisions in Jennings v. Rodriguez31 and Nielsen v. 
Preap32 and continued hard-line immigration policies from the Trump 
Administration,33 civil detention has become a prominent question for the 
Court. Neither of these recent cases addressed the constitutional 
permissiveness of the indefinite civil detention of migrants, and cases raising 
this question are percolating in the lower courts.34 
This Note draws on history and comparative analysis to argue that the 
indefinite detention of immigrants should be considered a criminal rather 
than a civil process, and that those detained are therefore owed a modicum 
of due process that they do not currently receive. The Note proceeds in four 
Parts. Part I traces the history of immigration law in the United States. It 
 
 27 Caitlin Dickerson, ‘There Is a Stench’: Soiled Clothes and No Baths for Migrant Children at a 
Texas Center, N.Y. TIMES (June 21, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/21/us/migrant-children-
border-soap.html [https://perma.cc/6VU7-R3RB]. 
 28 Id. For a broader discussion of conditions in detention centers, see Lizzie O’Leary, ‘Children Were 
Dirty, They Were Scared, and They Were Hungry’, ATLANTIC (June 25, 2019), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/family/archive/2019/06/child-detention-centers-immigration-attorney-
interview/592540/ [https://perma.cc/H25X-R7GK]. 
 29 Dickerson, supra note 27. 
 30 See, e.g., Manny Fernandez, Lawyer Draws Outrage for Defending Lack of Toothbrushes in 
Border Detention, N.Y. TIMES (June 25, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/25/us/sarah-fabian-
migrant-lawyer-doj.html [https://perma.cc/6HD7-QQFP]. 
 31 138 S. Ct. 830, 851 (2018) (declining to rule on the constitutional issue because the Court of 
Appeals ruled on statutory grounds rather than addressing the merits of the constitutional issue). 
 32 139 S. Ct. 954, 972 (2019) (ruling on statutory grounds because the respondents did not raise a 
head-on constitutional challenge to the statutes). 
 33 See, e.g., Hannah Dreier, Trust and Consequences, WASH. POST (Feb. 15, 2020) 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2020/national/immigration-therapy-reports-ice/ 
[https://perma.cc/M8HA-F64T] (detailing a Trump administration strategy that requires mental health 
professionals to turn over notes from mandatory therapy sessions to immigration officials, which 
professional therapy associations consider a violation of patient confidentiality). 
 34 Nielsen, 139 S. Ct. at 972; Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. at 851. The Supreme Court remanded Rodriguez, 
and district courts are currently opining on the constitutional issue. See, e.g., Kouadio v. Decker, 352 F. 
Supp. 3d 235, 241 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (ruling that a noncitizen detained for thirty-four months under a 
mandatory detention statute has a constitutional right to a bail hearing). 
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surveys the origins of federal regulation, examines Supreme Court cases 
defining the contours of civil detention, and discusses the origins and modern 
understanding of the federal government’s plenary power over immigration. 
Part II examines recent Supreme Court cases challenging the indefinite civil 
detention of migrants. Part III then explores two nonimmigration civil 
detention analogies: debtors’ prisons in early modern England and 
involuntary civil commitment in the substance abuse crisis context. Part IV 
draws on the analogies in Part III, identifies four features that help discern 
civil from criminal detention, and argues that the mandatory detention 
provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act are functionally criminal. 
I. HISTORY OF IMMIGRATION REGULATION 
This Part examines the federal government’s expansive powers over 
immigration. It traces the development of this power at the Supreme Court 
and examines how the power has been interpreted and applied. 
A. Birth of the Plenary Power: Landmark Cases on Immigration and 
the Constitution 
 At the time of the Founding, the United States was a nation that 
welcomed open immigration and the free flow of migrants, and for over a 
century, Congress did not regulate immigration.35 The federal government’s 
first major treaty in the field of immigration sought to encourage 
immigration between the United States and China.36 Over a decade of 
governmentally encouraged immigration followed. The Chinese population 
grew steadily in the Western States, and anti-Chinese sentiment ensued, 
particularly among industrialists and politicians.37 
In response, Congress enacted the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, 
suspending Chinese immigration to the United States.38 Notably, although 
this Act barred new Chinese immigrants from entering the country, it 
included an express exemption allowing Chinese subjects already present in 
 
 35 Paul Brickner & Meghan Hanson, The American Dreamers: Racial Prejudices and Discrimination 
as Seen Through the History of American Immigration Law, 26 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 203, 205 (2004). 
 36 Treaty with China, U.S-China, July 28, 1868, 16 Stat. 739 (known as the Burlingame Treaty). 
 37 The Burlingame-Seward Treaty, 1868, U.S. DEP’T ST.: OFF. HISTORIAN, 
https://history.state.gov/milestones/1866-1898/burlingame-seward-treaty [https://perma.cc/B2U9-
UUYL]. 
 38 Act of May 6, 1882, ch. 126, § 1, 22 Stat. 58, 58–59 (“[T]he coming of Chinese laborers to the 
United States . . . is hereby, suspended; and during such suspension it shall not be lawful for any Chinese 
laborer to come . . . to remain within the United States.”). 
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the United States to leave and reenter.39 Six years later, Congress passed 
another act revoking this reentry exception,40 barring Chinese immigrants 
living in America but traveling abroad from returning to the United States, 
even if they had valid reentry papers.41 It was under this framework that 
immigration law cases first reached the Supreme Court. 
In 1889, the Supreme Court decided Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 
the landmark case42 that gave rise to the plenary power doctrine. The Court 
upheld the 1888 Act, ruling that the “government of the United States . . . 
can exclude aliens from its territory,”43 establishing the federal government’s 
plenary power over immigration. Since Chae Chan Ping, the political 
branches have possessed absolute power over immigration at the border, and 
Congress has continued to legislate heavily in the area of immigration.44 The 
source of authority for the plenary power has not materially changed since 
Chae Chan Ping. In justifying the plenary power, the Court still uses what 
essentially amounts to a penumbral analysis,45 drawing on a mosaic of 
disparate enumerated powers to create a reservoir of authority46 that imbues 
 
 39 Id. § 3 (specifying that the prohibition “shall not apply to Chinese laborers who were in the United 
States” at the time the treaty took effect). 
 40 Act of Oct. 1, 1888, ch. 1064, 25 Stat. 504. 
 41 This statutory framework forbidding the reentry of resident aliens echoes through centuries of 
history to today. Consider the plight of a lawful permanent resident of the United States on an inbound 
flight to America at the moment President Trump’s first travel ban took effect, which barred reentry of 
lawful permanent residents. See Exec. Order No. 13769, § 3(c), 82 Fed. Reg. 8977, 8978 (Jan. 27, 2017) 
(superseded by Exec. Order No. 13780, 82 Fed. Reg. 13209 (Mar. 6, 2017)). 
 42 Weisselberg, supra note 6, at 946–51 (describing the importance of Chae Chan Ping and the 
subsequent rise of the plenary power). 
 43 Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 603 (1889). 
 44 See, e.g., Immigration and Nationality (McCarran-Walter) Act of 1952, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101–1537 
(2012); Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 
110 Stat. 3009; Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 
110 Stat. 1214. 
 45 The constitutional justification for the plenary power doctrine closely resembles the oft-criticized 
“penumbral” analysis in Griswold v. Connecticut. 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (holding that the “specific 
guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help 
give them life and substance”). But see id. at 508–10 (Black, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority’s 
penumbral analysis); Louis J. Sirico, Jr., Failed Constitutional Metaphors: The Wall of Separation and 
the Penumbra, 45 U. RICH. L. REV. 459, 488 (2011) (criticizing the penumbral analysis in privacy cases 
as “intellectually confusing”); William J. Watkins, Jr., The Driver’s Privacy Protection Act: Congress 
Makes a Wrong Turn, 49 S.C. L. REV. 983, 996 n.124 (1998) (“A ‘penumbra’ is a seemingly strange place 
to discover constitutional guarantees.”). 
 46 Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 604; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (supporting the plenary 
power doctrine’s rationale that if Congress may “regulate Commerce with foreign Nations,” it necessarily 
possesses a broader foreign affairs power); id. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 (Naturalization Clause) (supporting the 
plenary power doctrine’s rationale that if Congress may regulate which immigrants may enter the political 
community via naturalization, it may also regulate which immigrants may enter the physical community, 
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the federal government with plenary power over the regulation of 
immigration. 
In the century that followed Chae Chan Ping, the plenary power 
doctrine evolved rapidly. In Fong Yue Ting v. United States, the Court held 
that the federal government’s power to exclude aliens, as defined in Chae 
Chan Ping, naturally extends to the power to deport aliens.47 Importantly, 
Fong Yue Ting introduced the civil/criminal distinction in immigration law. 
When Fong Yue Ting argued that his expulsion violated due process, the 
Court ruled that because “[t]he order of deportation is not a punishment for 
crime,” but rather a noncriminal, civil action, Fong Yue Ting’s Fourteenth 
Amendment due process rights “have no application.”48 
The Court more directly addressed the civil/criminal distinction in 
Wong Wing v. United States. After finding that Wong Wing was unlawfully 
present within the United States, a commissioner ordered he be imprisoned 
at hard labor for sixty days and then deported from the United States.49 Wong 
Wing succeeded in arguing that imprisonment at hard labor was not a civil 
punishment but rather a criminal punishment that violated his Fifth and Sixth 
Amendment rights to a speedy and public trial.50 Although the Court had 
previously affirmed the lower court rulings in Chae Chan Ping and Fong 
Yue Ting, this time the Court ruled that the commissioner in Wong Wing had 
gone too far. Finding that imprisonment at hard labor is a criminal 
punishment, the Court ruled that the government may criminally punish an 
alien only after a criminal trial that affords the alien the full panoply of rights 
found in the Fifth and Sixth Amendments.51 
 
i.e., immigration into the United States); id. art. I, § 8, cl. 11 (supporting the plenary power doctrine’s 
rationale that if Congress may “declare War,” it possesses a broader foreign affairs power that provides 
authority for regulating immigration); id. art. I, § 9, cl. 1 (Slave Importation Clause) (supporting the 
plenary power doctrine’s rationale that if Congress may not regulate the importation of “Persons” prior 
to 1808, it may do so after 1808). Needless to say, none of these enumerated powers squarely grants the 
political branches the authority to regulate immigration, and plenary power proponents aggregate these 
disparate enumerated powers to support the plenary power doctrine. To find the federal government’s 
implied, unenumerated power to regulate immigration, the Supreme Court “listed powers that were all 
expressly enumerated in the Constitution.” Weisselberg, supra note 6, at 945. 
 47 Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 707 (1893). The Court relied upon the same 
justification as in Chae Chan Ping, reinforcing the theory that the plenary power draws its authority from 
various enumerated powers in the Constitution as well as powers that are “inherent in sovereignty.” Id. at 
705 (quoting Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 659 (1892)). 
 48 Id. at 730. 
 49 Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 239 (1896) (Field, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part) (reciting the facts of the case). 
 50 Id. at 233–34, 237 (majority opinion). 
 51 Id. at 237. Wong Wing is commonly regarded as a “crimmigration” case. Mary D. Fan, The Case 
for Crimmigration Reform, 92 N.C. L. REV. 75, 105 (2013). For a discussion of the criminalization of 
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In Wong Wing, the Supreme Court thus drew a line between civil 
immigration laws and criminal punishment.52 This line has endured,53 
forming the basis for indefinite civil detention that is the subject of this Note. 
To avoid the stringent judicial process that accompanies the criminal 
treatment of noncitizens, the federal government has long cabined exclusion, 
removal, and detention within the civil context. This has allowed the scope 
of the plenary power to expand in more recent Supreme Court cases. 
In these more recent cases, the Supreme Court has circumscribed 
judicial review of the actions of the political branches in the immigration 
context.54 The plenary power pulls back the traditional constitutional 
protections of due process and equal protection: so long as the government’s 
exercise of this power is a civil action based on a “facially legitimate and 
bona fide reason,”55 the political branches may make laws concerning 
aliens—such as the indefinite civil detention statutes—that “would be 
unacceptable if applied to citizens.”56 
B. The Plenary Power Applied: Indefinite  
Civil Detention 
The Supreme Court thus established by the end of the nineteenth 
century that detention of migrants is a civil matter. But saying that the 
government has plenary power to enforce this penalty does not describe the 
contours of that power. Furthermore, the constitutionality of this power has 
been questioned by a long line of cases which have asked: Does the plenary 
power permit the federal government to detain noncitizens for lengthy, often 
 
immigration law, or “crimmigration,” see Juliet Stumpf, The Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, 
and Sovereign Power, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 367 (2006). 
 52 Juliet P. Stumpf, States of Confusion: The Rise of State and Local Power over Immigration, 
86 N.C. L. REV. 1557, 1576 (2008). 
 53 The civil/criminal distinction has recently come under scrutiny by the Supreme Court. See 
Transcript of Oral Argument at 34, Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S. Ct. 682 (2019) (No. 17-1091); Damon Root, 
Neil Gorsuch, Civil Asset Forfeiture, and the Original Meaning of the 14th Amendment, REASON (Dec. 
4, 2018, 10:20 AM), https://reason.com/2018/12/04/neil-gorsuch-civil-asset-forfeiture-and 
[https://perma.cc/K6TK-J3RU]. At issue in Timbs was a state’s efforts to seize a criminal defendant’s 
vehicle via civil asset forfeiture. The State of Indiana conceded before the Indiana Supreme Court that 
this instance of civil asset forfeiture was punitive. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra, at 48. 
 54 See, e.g., Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977) (ruling that the government’s exercise of the 
plenary power is “largely immune from judicial control,” even in cases where the governmental action 
seemingly violates equal protection or due process); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 769 (1972) 
(articulating a standard for judicial review under the plenary power, holding that the Court will only ask 
whether the government has demonstrated a “facially legitimate and bona fide” reason for exercising the 
plenary power). 
 55 Kleindienst, 408 U.S. at 769. 
 56 Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 80 (1976). 
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indefinite periods of time without a bond hearing while the government 
either determines the migrant’s admissibility57 or tries to effectuate the 
migrant’s removal?58 This question is still alive at the Supreme Court, most 
recently raised (and avoided) in Jennings v. Rodriguez59 and Nielsen v. 
Preap,60 discussed in Part II. This Part explores the ways the Court has 
addressed or avoided this question over time. 
The Supreme Court first addressed this question in a pair of cases in the 
early 1950s. Taken together, United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy61 
and Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei62 represent the high-water 
mark of the plenary power doctrine.63 In Knauff, the Court addressed the 
exclusion and detention of an alien married to an American citizen. Ellen 
Knauff was a German woman who fled Nazi Germany in 1939.64 She 
resettled in England as a refugee, where she served as a flight sergeant in the 
British Royal Air Force during World War II.65 She later served as a civilian 
employee with the War Department of the United States66 and married Kurt 
Knauff, an American citizen and U.S. Army veteran of World War II.67 
On August 14, 1948, Ellen Knauff arrived at Ellis Island, seeking entry 
and naturalization under American immigration laws and the War Brides 
Act.68 Immediately, she was temporarily excluded and subsequently detained 
at Ellis Island.69 After sitting in a jail cell for two months, Ellen Knauff 
learned the unfortunate news: the Attorney General had ordered her excluded 
because “her admission would be prejudicial to the interests of the United 
 
 57 I.e., asylum seekers. Under the law, 8 U.S.C. §1225(b) (2012) mandates that asylum seekers who 
establish a credible fear of persecution “shall be detained for further consideration of the application” 
(emphasis added). 
 58 I.e., aliens who have been ordered removed. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(b), 1226(c) (2012). 
 59 138 S. Ct. 830, 851 (2018). 
 60 139 S. Ct. 954, 972 (2019). 
 61 338 U.S. 537 (1950). 
 62 345 U.S. 206 (1953). 
 63 Weisselberg, supra note 6, at 954. 
 64 Knauff, 338 U.S. at 539. 
 65 Id. 
 66 Id. 
 67 Id. 
 68 Weisselberg, supra note 6, at 955. 
 69 Knauff, 338 U.S. at 539. 
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States.”70 Denied a hearing to challenge her exclusion, Knauff filed a habeas 
petition.71 
In denying her petition and condoning both her exclusion and her 
indefinite civil detention on Ellis Island, the Supreme Court delivered an 
enduring articulation of judicial deference in the plenary power context: 
admission is a privilege, not a right.72 As such, “[w]hatever the procedure 
authorized by Congress is, it is due process as far as an alien denied entry is 
concerned.”73 With this judgment, the Supreme Court emphasized judicial 
deference to the political branches’ immigration decisions,74 a notion alive 
and well in modern immigration law jurisprudence.75 Knauff still serves as 
jumping-off point for determining how much due process an alien receives.76 
Three years later, the Supreme Court decided Shaughnessy v. United 
States ex rel. Mezei, bringing the plenary power doctrine to its zenith. Mezei 
was ordered excluded under the same statute and regulations as Ellen 
Knauff.77 Writing for the Court, Justice Clark framed the issue as one of 
continued exclusion: since Ignatz Mezei was a noncitizen seeking entry into 
the United States, the Court would defer to the political branches’ 
determinations on immigration matters.78 Citing Chae Chan Ping, Fong Yue 
Ting, and Knauff as support, Justice Clark noted that exclusion is a 
“fundamental sovereign attribute exercised by the Government’s political 
departments largely immune from judicial control.”79 Mr. Mezei’s temporary 
 
 70 Id. at 539–40. The government contended that Ellen Knauff engaged in espionage while serving 
in the U.S. Army’s Civil Censorship Division by supplying secrets to Czechoslovakian officials. 
Weisselberg, supra note 6, at 960–61. 
 71 Her petition was based primarily on the War Brides Act, ch. 591, 59 Stat. 659 (1945). Knauff, 
338 U.S. at 540. 
 72 Knauff, 338 U.S. at 542 (“Such privilege is granted to an alien only upon such terms as the United 
States shall prescribe.”). 
 73 Id. at 544 (citing Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651 (1892)). 
 74 Weisselberg, supra note 6, at 956. 
 75 See Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2409 (2012) (noting that a “searching inquiry into the 
persuasiveness of the President’s justifications is inconsistent with . . . the deference traditionally 
accorded the President in [the immigration] sphere”). 
 76 See, e.g., Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32 (1982) (citing the extremely deferential Knauff 
standard before discussing the facts of the case and how much due process the respondent is afforded); 
see also Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212 (1953) (citing the same standard). 
But see Cafeteria & Rest. Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961) (contrasting the scant 
process due to noncitizens, for whom the “it has been possible to characterize [the] private interest [of 
entering the United States] . . . as a mere privilege subject to the Executive’s plenary power” with the 
more robust due process analysis afforded to the citizen-petitioner in that case). 
 77 Weisselberg, supra note 6, at 965. 
 78 Mezei, 345 U.S. at 207, 213. 
 79 Id. at 210. 
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harborage on Ellis Island did not change his status or confer any additional 
rights;80 rather, just like Ellen Knauff, Ignatz Mezei was an alien at the 
doorstep of the United States seeking the privilege of admission into the 
country.81 As such, the Court applied the standard of judicial deference 
articulated in Knauff.82 Mr. Mezei had been denied entry to the United States, 
but he was free to leave Ellis Island for another country at any time.83 
If only that were so! In dissent, Justice Jackson recast the issue as about 
exclusion rather than detention.84 Whereas the majority opinion declared that 
Mr. Mezei was free to depart the United States at any time and thus end his 
indefinite civil detention on Ellis Island, Justice Jackson noted that this 
would be true “if only he were an amphibian!”85 With this rejoinder, Justice 
Jackson cut through the majority opinion’s legal fiction and revealed the 
practical result of the decision. In condoning Mezei’s continued detention, 
the Court had elevated the plenary power to its high-water mark. 
Mezei is a landmark decision in the indefinite civil detention line of 
cases. Conservative justices relied on Justice Clark’s majority opinion as 
controlling in future cases.86 Liberal justices drew on Justice Jackson’s 
dissenting opinion, expressing serious doubts that modern statutes 
 
 80 Id. at 215. 
 81 Id. at 212 (noting that for the purposes of rights and due process, Mezei was considered an “alien 
on the threshold of initial entry”). Scholars and commentators refer to this phenomenon as the “entry 
fiction.” See Zainab A. Cheema, A Constitutional Case for Extending the Due Process Clause to Asylum 
Seekers: Revisiting the Entry Fiction After Boumediene, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 289, 306 (2018). 
 82 Mezei, 345 U.S. at 216. 
 83 Id. at 220 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (ridiculing the government’s such assertion). 
 84 Id. (“Realistically, this man is incarcerated by a combination of forces which keep him as 
effectually as a prison, the dominant and proximate of these forces being the United States immigration 
authority. It overworks legal fiction to say that one is free in law when by the commonest of common 
sense he is bound.”). 
 85 Id. 
 86 See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 705 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Because I believe Mezei 
controls these cases, and, like the Court, I also see no reason to reconsider Mezei, I find no constitutional 
impediment to the discretion Congress gave to the Attorney General.”). Some scholars read the plenary 
power doctrine as historically rooted in the Court’s reticence to upset international affairs. See Peter J. 
Spiro, Explaining the End of Plenary Power, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 339, 340 (2002). Justice Field initially 
articulated this reticence in Chae Chan Ping v. United States. 130 U.S. 581, 609 (1889) (“If there be any 
just ground of complaint on the part of China, it must be made to the political department of our 
government, which is alone competent to act upon the subject.”). But with the global balance of power 
more stable and predictable than in centuries past, some scholars believe that the plenary power doctrine 
is “historically contingent on a global system whose time is passing.” See Spiro, supra, at 340–42. This 
view of the plenary power argues that, because the threat posed by judicial intervention in this area is 
greatly diminished, Zadvydas might signal the Court has reason to limit the application of the plenary 
power doctrine to terrorism-related cases. Id. 
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mandating the indefinite civil detention of noncitizens could pass 
constitutional muster in light of the historical significance of habeas corpus.87 
For instance, in a more recent line of cases, the Court addressed the 
plenary power in the context of indefinite civil detention. In Zadvydas v. 
Davis,88 the Court considered the validity of an immigration statute89 that 
permitted the Attorney General to indefinitely detain an alien who had been 
ordered removed from the country. Kestutis Zadvydas, a resident alien of the 
United States, had been ordered deported to Germany following a string of 
drug, theft, and battery offenses.90 Although Zadvydas was born in a 
displaced persons camp in postwar Germany, the German government did 
not consider him a German citizen.91 As a result, Mr. Zadvydas found himself 
in the same legal limbo as Ignatz Mezei—not welcome in America and not 
accepted anywhere else. Like Mr. Mezei, Mr. Zadvydas faced the prospect 
of spending the rest of his life in civil detention, all without ever having the 
chance to challenge his detention. 
Although the government argued that Mezei controlled, authorizing Mr. 
Zadvydas’s continued civil detention without a bond hearing,92 the Court 
distinguished Mr. Zadvydas’s circumstances from Mr. Mezei’s. Whereas 
Mezei’s harborage on Ellis Island did not count as entry into the United 
States,93 permitting the Court to treat him as if he had been “stopped at the 
border”94 for constitutional purposes, Mr. Zadvydas was firmly within the 
interior of the United States. His presence within the country placed Mr. 
Zadvydas on different legal footing, providing him with more constitutional 
protections than an alien requesting admission at the border. 
 
 87 See Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 876 (2018) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[S]ince 
Blackstone’s time and long before, liberty has included the right of a confined person to seek release on 
bail. It is neither technical nor unusually difficult to read the words of these statutes as consistent with 
this basic right.”). 
 88 533 U.S. at 678. 
 89 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) (2012). The text of this statute authorizes the Attorney General to detain a 
removable alien indefinitely beyond the ninety-day removal period established in 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1231(a)(1)(A). 
 90 Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 684–85. 
 91 Id. 
 92 Id. at 692 (“The Government argues that, from a constitutional perspective, alien status itself can 
justify indefinite detention, and points to Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei as support.” (citation 
omitted)). 
 93 I.e., the “entry fiction.” 
 94 Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 693 (quoting Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 215 
(1953)); see also id. at 719–20 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
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Writing for the Court, Justice Breyer invoked the substantive canon of 
constitutional avoidance95 in addressing the detention statute. Rather than 
strike the statute in its entirety, Justice Breyer read it to include an implicit 
six-month limit on the civil detention of aliens.96 Justice Breyer was careful 
to note that this implicit limit does not mean that every alien must be released 
after six months.97 Rather, after six months of indefinite civil detention, an 
alien is entitled to a hearing to contest his or her detention and show good 
reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the 
reasonably foreseeable future, and the burden then shifts to the government 
to rebut that showing.98 With this decision, Justice Breyer did not question 
the general doctrine of the plenary power.99 Instead, he relied on the 
border/interior distinction to rule that the plenary power does not permit the 
federal government to condemn an alien already present in the United States 
to an indefinite term of imprisonment because of the government’s inability 
to effectuate that alien’s removal.100 
But in the mirror image of Justice Jackson in Mezei, Justice Scalia 
reframed the issue in Zadvydas. In his view, this case was not about 
detention; it was about whether an alien like Mr. Zadvydas—who has no 
legal right to be in the country—has a constitutional right to be released into 
the interior of the United States.101 Justice Scalia rejected the Court’s attempt 
to distinguish Mezei,102 writing that Mezei should control this case, 
permitting the continued indefinite civil detention of Mr. Zadvydas.103 In 
 
 95 See Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (“The 
Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly presented by the record, if there is 
also present some other ground upon which the case may be disposed of.”). 
 96 Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701. 
 97 Id. 
 98 Id. 
 99 Soon after the opinion, scholars argued that because Zadvydas reads more naturally as a case about 
fundamental justice than principled constitutional reasoning, it does not signal the demise of the plenary 
power doctrine. T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Detaining Plenary Power: The Meaning and Impact of 
Zadvydas v. Davis, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 365, 386 (2002) (“Zadvydas, then, reads like some of the 
important Warren Court opinions. Pursuing a just goal against the backdrop of unfriendly precedents, it 
reaches, compromises, and confounds on the way to a value-laden result . . . . [I]f the sun were directly 
overhead, it will shine brightly but cast almost no shadow.”). 
 100 Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 695. 
 101 Id. at 702–03 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 102 Although the ruling in Zadvydas affords migrants squarely within the United States a bond 
hearing every six months, scholars have found it significant that the Court did not reconsider or overrule 
Mezei. In distinguishing Mezei rather than overturning it, the opinion in Zadvydas “preserves a 
foundational case in the plenary power edifice[,]” signaling that Zadvydas is not the demise of the plenary 
power doctrine. Aleinikoff, supra note 99, at 374. 
 103 Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 704–05 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Congress undoubtedly thought that both 
groups of aliens—inadmissible aliens at the threshold and criminal aliens under final order of removal—
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doing so, Justice Scalia’s dissent revived Mezei as an authoritative statement 
of the plenary power104—over aliens detained at the border as well as aliens 
detained within the interior of the United States.105 
As the foregoing analysis demonstrates, the Court has held that the 
federal government has plenary power to “temporarily” indefinitely detain 
migrants at the border or pending deportation. The key fact upon which the 
Court’s analysis has turned is that such detention is civil, not criminal. This 
Note now examines the most recent cases to present these issues at the 
Supreme Court, wherein the Court avoided addressing the constitutionality 
of such detentions, restricting its analysis to textual interpretation of the laws 
at issue. 
II. JENNINGS V. RODRIGUEZ & NIELSEN V. PREAP 
So far, this Note has surveyed landmark cases that have shaped the 
contours of the plenary power. These cases are not only consequential—they 
are also deeply personal. In each case—Chae Chan Ping, Wong Wing, 
Knauff, Mezei, Zadvydas—the Court considered the plenary power and 
indefinite civil detention in the context of a detailed personal narrative—a 
war bride hoping to reunite with her husband;106 a Buffalo family man who 
just wanted to go home;107 a stateless convict with nowhere to go.108 Justice 
 
could be constitutionally detained on the same terms . . . . Because I believe Mezei controls these cases, 
and, like the Court, I also see no reason to reconsider Mezei, I find no constitutional impediment to the 
discretion Congress gave to the Attorney General.”). 
 104 Surveying immigration cases after Zadvydas, namely the travel ban case, other scholars suggest 
that the plenary power is in retreat, or perhaps just less visible in Supreme Court opinions, due to changing 
views of the doctrine’s historical roots in racism and xenophobia. See, e.g., Eric K. Yamamoto & Rachel 
Oyama, Masquerading Behind a Facade of National Security, 128 YALE L.J. F. 688, 719–21 (2019) 
(“Without saying so explicitly, the Court in Trump [v. Hawaii] invoked . . . plenary power over 
immigration by citing three older cases embracing that doctrine . . . . Changing legislative, judicial, and 
public views of human rights and racism have undercut the doctrine’s reach and standing—a likely reason 
the Trump majority invoked its tenets without explicitly naming it.” (footnote omitted)). 
 105 Two years after Zadvydas, the Court took up another case involving a mandatory civil detention 
statute. In Demore v. Hyung Joon Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (2003), the Court upheld an immigration statute, 
8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), that mandated the detention of certain aliens pending their removal. The Immigration 
and Naturalization Service ordered Hyung Joon Kim deported, and Kim was detained pending his 
removal. Id. at 513. This detention lasted six months. Id. at 531. In upholding the mandatory detention 
statute, the Court stressed the temporary nature of Kim’s detention: unlike Zadvydas’s detention, which 
was “‘indefinite’ and ‘potentially permanent,’” Kim’s detention was shorter in duration, and only 
stretched on for six months because Kim had requested a continuance. Id. If Kim had not done so, the 
government would have been able to more quickly effectuate Kim’s removal and thus end his civil 
detention. 
 106 United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 539 (1950). 
 107 Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 207 (1953). 
 108 Zadvydas, 533 U.S. 678. 
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Jackson found it “fortunate[]” that in nineteenth- and twentieth-century 
America, it was still “startling” to find a person held indefinitely without 
accusation of crime or a judicial trial.109 
Twenty-first-century America is not so fortunate. Changes in the 
immigration law landscape have precipitated a dramatic increase in the 
number of migrants facing indefinite civil detention.110 To counter the uptick 
in illegal immigration, President Clinton signed the Illegal Immigration 
Reform and Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA)111 into law, expanding the 
federal government’s authority to indefinitely detain select classes of 
aliens.112 Jennings v. Rodriguez113 and Nielsen v. Preap114 arose in this 
regulatory landscape. 
A. Jennings v. Rodriguez 
Alejandro Rodriguez, a Mexican citizen and lawful permanent resident 
of the United States, was convicted of drug and theft offenses in 2004.115 The 
government detained Rodriguez under one of the mandatory civil detention 
statutes pending his removal.116 After three years of incarceration, 
Rodriguez—alongside a class of similarly situated lawful permanent 
residents—filed a habeas corpus petition challenging his detention.117 
Rodriguez argued that the mandatory civil detention statutes118 do not 
authorize lengthy civil detention without a bond hearing.119 Unlike prior civil 
detention cases like Mezei and Zadvydas, Jennings was a class action suit on 
behalf of thousands of noncitizens subjected to indefinite civil detention, 
 
 109 Mezei, 345 U.S. at 218 (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
 110 Melinda Juárez et al., Twenty Years After IIRIRA: The Rise of Immigrant Detention and Its Effects 
on Latinx Communities Across the Nation, 6 J. MIGRATION & HUM. SECURITY 74, 76–77 (2018). 
 111 Act of Sept. 30, 1996, Pub. L. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009. 
 112 Memorandum from President William Clinton to the Heads of Executive Departments and 
Agencies: Deterring Illegal Immigration, 60 Fed. Reg. 28, 7885, 7887 (Feb. 10, 1995) (“The 
Administration’s deterrence strategy includes strengthening the country’s detention and deportation 
capability. No longer will criminals and other high risk deportable aliens be released back into 
communities because of a shortage of detention space and ineffective deportation procedures.”). 
 113 138 S. Ct. 830 (2018). 
 114 139 S. Ct. 954 (2019). 
 115 Jennings, 138 S. Ct. at 838. 
 116 Id. Rodriguez was detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226. 
 117 Id. 
 118 Namely, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(b), 1226(a), and 1226(c). 
 119 Jennings, 138 S. Ct. at 838; see also Miriam Peguero Medrano, Not Yet Gone, and Not Yet 
Forgotten: The Reasonableness of Continued Mandatory Detention of Noncitizens Without a Bond 
Hearing, 108 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 597, 621 (2018) (summarizing Jennings’s procedural posture). 
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underscoring the now-widespread nature of civil detention in immigration 
law.120 
In the Ninth Circuit, Alejandro Rodriguez argued that prolonged 
mandatory detention without any possibility of review by a neutral arbiter 
raised grave constitutional concerns.121 Drawing on Justice Breyer’s decision 
in Zadvydas, Rodriguez asked the Ninth Circuit to read the relevant statutory 
provisions to require a bond hearing when an alien’s detention exceeds six 
months.122 The Ninth Circuit did exactly that.123 The court engaged in 
constitutional avoidance, construing the statute to contain an implicit six-
month limit on detention, after which aliens would be able to challenge the 
validity of their continued detention.124 
Writing for the Supreme Court, Justice Alito reversed the Ninth Circuit 
and remanded the case.125 While acknowledging that the statutes pose 
constitutional concerns, Justice Alito remarked that constitutional avoidance 
is only appropriate when the language is susceptible to multiple plausible 
interpretations.126 Reviewing the language of the relevant statutory 
provisions, Justice Alito found that the plain text of these provisions is 
unambiguous, mandating civil detention for select classes of aliens.127 Since 
the language of these provisions does not permit the sort of ambiguity found 
 
 120 See The Supreme Court, 2017 Term—Leading Cases: Federal Statutes: Immigration and 
Nationality Act, 132 HARV. L. REV. 417, 417–18 (2018). Jennings was a class action suit on behalf of 
aliens detained pursuant to four statutory provisions. The first provision—§ 1225(b)—applied to asylum 
seekers. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii) (2012) (“If the officer determines at the time of the interview that 
an alien has a credible fear of persecution (within the meaning of clause (v)), the alien shall be detained 
for further consideration of the application for asylum.” (emphasis added)). The second provision—
§ 1226(c)—applies to aliens convicted of certain enumerated crimes. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(A)–(B) (“The 
Attorney General shall take into custody any alien who . . . is inadmissible by reason of having committed 
any offense covered in [various sections of the Immigration and Nationality Act] . . . [or] is deportable 
by reason of having committed any offense covered in [various sections of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act] . . . .” (emphasis added)). The third provision—§ 1226(a)—applies to immigrants facing 
removal proceedings. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) (“On a warrant issued by the Attorney General, an alien may be 
arrested and detained pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the United States.”). 
The final provision—§ 1231(a)—applies to immigrants who have been ordered removed from the 
country. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)–(2) (“During the removal period, the Attorney General shall detain the 
alien. Under no circumstance during the removal period shall the Attorney General release an 
alien . . . .”). 
 121 Rodriguez v. Robbins, 715 F.3d 1127, 1132 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 122 Id. at 1132, 1138. 
 123 Id. at 1146. 
 124 Id. at 1133. 
 125 Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 836 (2018). 
 126 Id. 
 127 Id. at 848. 
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in the Zadvydas statute,128 the Court held that the Ninth Circuit was wrong to 
read in a six-month limit on civil detention.129 Justice Alito went so far as to 
suggest that the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of the statute tortures the 
text.130 Notably, the Supreme Court did not reach the issue of whether these 
mandatory detention provisions can pass constitutional muster. Because the 
Ninth Circuit decided Jennings on a textual basis, the Court found no 
occasion to consider the respondents’ constitutional arguments.131 
Writing in dissent, Justice Breyer first responded to the majority’s 
reading of the statute. Justice Breyer found that the majority’s reading of the 
detention statute—as prohibiting an alien from obtaining a bail hearing to 
seek release from civil detention—raised grave doubts about the statute’s 
constitutionality, even against the backdrop of the plenary power.132 Justice 
Breyer addressed the respondents’ constitutional arguments, drawing on 
Anglo-American history in his opinion.133 Justice Breyer noted that because 
they are denied an opportunity to challenge their detention and seek release 
via a bond hearing, aliens subjected to these provisions are deprived of 
liberty without due process of law.134 
Importantly, Justice Breyer acknowledged the limitations of the Anglo-
American historical argument in the civil detention context.135 Most of the 
historical cases he cited involve criminal proceedings; on the other hand, 
 
 128 The Court distinguished 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(b), 1226(a), and 1226(c) from the detention statute at 
issue in Zadvydas, 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) (2012). 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) uses the word “may,” permitting, 
but not requiring, the Attorney General to detain aliens ordered removed from the country. Jennings, 
138 S. Ct. at 844; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) (“An alien ordered removed . . . may be detained.” 
(emphasis added)). While the use of the word “may” allowed the Zadvydas court to find ambiguity in the 
statute, the detention statutes at issue in Jennings use the word “shall,” requiring the Attorney General to 
detain certain classes of aliens. Jennings, 138 S. Ct. at 844; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii) (“[T]he 
alien shall be detained . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
 129 Jennings, 138 S. Ct. at 851. 
 130 Id. at 848 (“[T]he dissent evidently has a strong stomach when it comes to inflicting linguistic 
trauma [upon the words of Congress].”). 
 131 Id. at 851. 
 132 Id. at 861 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing United States v. Jin Fuey Moy, 241 U.S. 394, 401 
(1916)). 
 133 Id. (“The Due Process Clause—itself reflecting the language of the Magna Carta—prevents 
arbitrary detention.”). 
 134 Id. (citing to Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 237–38 (1896)); see also U.S. CONST. 
amend. V. 
 135 Justice Breyer notes that there are not many different forms of civil detention. Jennings, 138 S. 
Ct. at 864 (Breyer, J., dissenting). After discussing the Anglo-American history of providing a bail 
hearing to detained individuals, Justice Breyer acknowledges that “[t]he cases before us, however, are not 
criminal cases. Does that fact make a difference? The problem is that there are not many instances of civil 
confinement . . . . Mental illness does sometimes provide an example. Individuals dangerous to 
themselves or others may be confined involuntarily to a mental hospital.” Id. 
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aliens indefinitely detained under the Immigration and Nationality Act are 
subjected to civil detention.136 To blunt this counterargument, Justice Breyer 
analogized to cases involving the involuntary confinement of persons 
suffering from mental illness.137 Although these individuals do not possess 
“what we could call ‘a right to a bail hearing,’” they nevertheless have the 
equivalent right to a hearing prior to confinement, as well as the right to 
challenge their detention at least annually.138 In Justice Breyer’s view, the 
same rationale should apply in the context of mandatory civil detention of 
aliens.139 Based on this analogy and the historical importance of the right to 
seek bail in the Anglo-American tradition, Justice Breyer would have 
affirmed the Ninth Circuit’s reading of the statute, affording aliens the right 
to challenge their detention and seek bail if their detention extends longer 
than six months.140 
The cases that formed the Jennings class action suit are currently 
percolating on remand. As early as December 2018, lower courts have begun 
issuing rulings on the constitutional issue of whether the plenary power 
authorizes the indefinite detention of certain classes of aliens without the 
opportunity to seek bail.141 The Supreme Court will face these circumstances 
again—and this time, they will likely need to address the constitutional 
question. 
 
 136 Id. 
 137 Id. at 864. Justice Breyer’s dissent in Jennings analogizes to involuntary hospitalization to better 
understand the importance of bail hearings. This Note engages in a similar exercise to understand the 
permissiveness of involuntary civil detention. 
 138 Id. 
 139 Id. 
 140 Id. at 876 (“I would read the statutory words as consistent with, indeed as requiring protection of, 
the basic right to seek bail.”). 
 141 See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Marin, 909 F.3d 252, 256–57 (9th Cir. 2018) (remanding Jennings to the 
district court to decide the constitutional issue, citing approvingly to Zadvydas and United States v. 
Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987), and suggesting that the detention statutes are unconstitutional by noting 
that “liberty is the norm, and detention prior to trial or without trial is the carefully limited exception” 
(quoting Salerno, 481 U.S. at 755)); Kouadio v. Decker, 352 F. Supp. 3d 235, 241 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) 
(ruling in favor of a noncitizen detained under one of these provisions, holding that “34 months of 
detention is too long without an opportunity for bail”). Interestingly, the Ninth Circuit excerpted a quote 
from Justice Breyer’s dissent in Jennings that highlights the Magna Carta argument. The lower court 
seems to think that the historical argument is one of Mr. Rodriguez’s best arguments. The three-judge 
panel also hints at an originalist lens, claiming that the framers would likely have found this 
unconstitutional. Rodriguez, 909 F.3d at 257. 
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B. Nielsen v. Preap 
Just one year later, the Court decided another case examining the 
application of a mandatory civil detention statute. In Nielsen v. Preap,142 
litigants challenged the application of 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), which requires the 
Secretary of Homeland Security to arrest aliens who have committed certain 
crimes “when [they were] released” from criminal custody and to place them 
into civil detention without the opportunity for a bond hearing.143 In this case, 
Preap argued—and the Ninth Circuit agreed—that this mandatory detention 
applies only when an alien is arrested and detained immediately after he or 
she is released from criminal custody.144 The respondents in this case had 
committed certain crimes covered by 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c); however, they 
were not arrested immediately after their release from criminal custody.145 
Some were not arrested until several years later.146 In short, these plaintiffs 
were not challenging the constitutionality of these mandatory detention 
provisions; rather, they contended that these provisions should not apply to 
them because of the significant lag time between their release from criminal 
custody and their civil detention. This lag time, in their reading of the statute, 
does not qualify as an arrest “when . . . released” from criminal custody.147 
Justice Alito, again writing for the Court, overturned the Ninth Circuit 
on textual grounds and ruled that the mandatory detention provision of 
8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) applied to the respondents.148 The several-year lag time 
between Preap’s release from criminal custody and his arrest and detention 
by immigration officials did not bar the government from applying the 
statute and holding him in civil detention.149 Having again decided a 
mandatory civil detention case on textual grounds, the Court did not reach 
the merits of the constitutionality of the provision itself. The Court did, 
however, acknowledge the elephant in the room, noting that “[w]hile 
respondents might have raised a head-on constitutional challenge to 
§ 1226(c), they did not. Our decision today on the meaning of that statutory 
provision does not foreclose as-applied challenges—that is, constitutional 
 
 142 139 S. Ct. 954 (2019). 
 143 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) (2018); Preap, 139 S. Ct. at 960. 
 144 Preap, 139 S. Ct. at 961. 
 145 Id. 
 146 Id. Mony Preap, the lead plaintiff in the case, had not been detained by immigration officials until 
seven years after his release from criminal custody. Id. 
 147 Id. at 964. 
 148 Id. at 964–65. 
 149 For the Court’s extensive discussion of the text of 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), see id. at 964. The Court’s 
textual analysis of § 1226(c) is not relevant to the subject of this Note. 
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challenges to applications of the statute as we have now read it.”150 In short, 
the Court noted that Preap is a narrow decision that only addresses the 
statutory construction of 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c).151 Given the proper vehicle,152 
the Court indicated it will consider the constitutional issue. 
In dissent, Justice Breyer again countered the Court’s textual analysis, 
and again explored the historical argument, suggesting that because the right 
to a bail hearing is so deeply ingrained in Anglo-American jurisprudence, 
statutes that deny a person this important right will likely fail constitutional 
muster.153 Specifically responding to Justice Kavanaugh’s concurrence 
urging that the issue before the court is “narrow,”154 Justice Breyer indicated 
that the Court cannot continue to punt on the constitutional issue. Since the 
Court cannot decide these issues without considering the “basic American 
legal value[]” of the right to not be deprived of liberty without due process, 
the Court will eventually need to rule on the constitutionality of these 
provisions.155 
III. ANALOGS OF MODERN CIVIL DETENTION 
This Part of the Note seeks to answer the question: where else in history 
do we see institutions that resemble civil detention, and how, if at all, does it 
help us better understand civil detention in the modern American 
immigration system? In studying these analogies, this Note seeks to detail 
the context and legal bases of these forms of detention, and to examine 
whether, despite the limits of these comparisons, they are instructive 
regarding the civil detention of migrants. 
A. Debtors’ Prisons in Early Modern England: Proto-Civil Detention 
A skeptical reader might initially question the value of examining 
debtors’ prisons as an analogy to modern civil detention of migrants in the 
American immigration system. Debtors’ prisons seem, on the surface, quite 
different from modern civil detention of migrants—they existed in a different 
country and were abolished a long time ago.156 Nevertheless, history is one 
 
 150 Id. at 972. 
 151 Id. 
 152 I.e., Jennings returning to the Supreme Court. 
 153 Preap, 139 S. Ct. at 976, 985 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 154 Id. at 973 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring). 
 155 Id. at 985 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 156 Although debtors’ prisons were abolished over a century ago in England, some scholars argue 
that they have come roaring back in modern America, with hundreds of thousands of individuals jailed 
in pretrial detention due to inability to pay cash bail. Peter Wagner, Jails Matter. But Who Is Listening?, 
PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (Aug. 14, 2015), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/blog/2015/08/14/jailsmatter/ 
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of the best tools available to grapple with the issues of today.157 And as this 
Note reveals, how debtors’ prisons worked and the reasons they were 
abolished hold lessons for the topic at hand. 
Imprisonment in a debtors’ prison followed a civil action between two 
private individuals. When a creditor sought to recover debts owed to him by 
a debtor, he could have the debtor detained in a debtors’ prison until the 
debtor could pay.158 Imprisonment for debt was thus technically a civil action 
between two private citizens that resulted in the use of state resources—the 
state maintained the facilities and detained debtors on behalf of creditors.159 
Under this regime, the British legal system did not technically permit 
imprisonment for debt; rather, debtors were “committed” to a debtors’ prison 
for contempt of court for failing to pay a creditor.160 
Imprisonment for debt involved lengthy, indefinite stays in prison. 
Legally speaking, a debtor could terminate the imprisonment by paying the 
debt and satisfying the creditor.161 Of course, the ability of the debtor to 
voluntarily end their confinement was a fiction for those who lacked the 
ability to pay. As a result, the British Attorney General noted that 
imprisonment for debt was “the power which a creditor had to imprison a 
debtor for an unlimited time until the debt was paid.”162 One historian 
detailed the fate of a woman who died in prison after forty-five years of 
 
[https://perma.cc/4KEU-72BS]. See generally Eli Hager, Debtors’ Prisons, Then and Now: FAQ, 
MARSHALL PROJECT (Feb. 24, 2015), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2015/02/24/debtors-prisons-
then-and-now-faq [https://perma.cc/7J2B-DBWR] (arguing debtors’ prisons live on today with 
Americans jailed for failure to pay private debts as well as debts accrued through involvement in the 
criminal justice system, such as public defender fees and DNA testing fees). 
 157 As Winston Churchill once said, “The longer you can look back, the farther you can look 
forward.” OXFORD ESSENTIAL QUOTATIONS (Susan Ratcliffe ed., 6th ed. 2018) (ebook). Justice Jackson 
understood the value of historical analysis, citing to the context of the Magna Carta to understand the 
importance of freedom from arbitrary detention in the Anglo-American legal tradition. Shaughnessy v. 
United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 218 (1953) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (“Executive imprisonment 
has been considered oppressive and lawless since John, at Runnymede, pledged that no free man should 
be imprisoned, dispossessed, outlawed, or exiled save by the judgment of his peers or by the law of the 
land.”). He also drew on more modern history, namely his experience as the American prosecutor at 
Nuremberg. In reflecting on the fate of Ignatz Mezei, Justice Jackson saw strong overtones of the 
travesties of Nazi Germany’s judicial system. Jackson likened Mezei’s indefinite civil detention without 
a judicial hearing to the Third Reich’s system of “protective custody,” in which the arrested “could claim 
no judicial or other hearing process.” Id. at 225–26. 
 158 Jay Cohen, The History of Imprisonment for Debt and Its Relation to the Development of 
Discharge in Bankruptcy, 3 J. LEGAL HIST. 153, 155–56 (1982). 
 159 See id. 
 160 Stephen J. Ware, A 20th Century Debate About Imprisonment for Debt, 54 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 
351, 355–56 (2014) (explaining the technical legal basis for imprisonment for debt). 
 161 Cohen, supra note 158, at 155–56. 
 162 197 Parl Deb HC (4th ser.) (1869) col. 421. 
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imprisonment for a debt of £19.163 Whereas other European countries had 
mostly enacted legislation limiting imprisonment for debt to one year, 
debtors in England had no such relief.164 
In addition to lengthy prison stays, imprisonment for debt was notorious 
for wretched conditions in state-sponsored prisons.165 By the late eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries, approximately 10,000 Englishmen were 
imprisoned for debt annually under horrid conditions.166 
Although members of all social classes filled debtors’ prisons, 
conditions varied greatly. Whereas wealthier and better-connected debtors 
could pay to be transferred to prisons with more pleasant conditions, poorer 
debtors lived in squalor, facing illness, hunger, and death.167 The poorest of 
the poor faced starvation and disease.168 Large numbers of debtors were 
crammed into small spaces—in one ward of the Marshalsea Prison, thirty-
two men occupied a sixteen-by-fourteen foot cell.169 Such conditions resulted 
in a horrid stench, and on summer nights, some debtors “perished for want 
of Air.”170 
Debtors’ prisons also blurred the line between civil and criminal law. 
Imprisonment for debt dates back to the thirteenth century.171 As such, one 
historian argued that it is “a relic of the time when there was no clear 
distinction between civil and criminal law.”172 This indistinct division 
between the civil and the criminal endured for centuries. In Marshalsea 
Prison, populations were mixed, with the criminally convicted serving their 
 
 163 Bruce Kercher, The Transformation of Imprisonment for Debt in England, 1828 to 1838, at 
2 AUSTL. J.L. & SOC’Y 60, 65 (1984). 
 164 ROGER LEE BROWN, A HISTORY OF THE FLEET PRISON, LONDON 108 (1996). 
 165 Although many debtors’ prisons were privately operated and for-profit, they were functionally 
public institutions, akin to modern-day private prisons, contracted by the government. See Jerry White, 
Pain and Degradation in Georgian London: Life in the Marshalsea Prison, 68 HIST. WORKSHOP J. 69, 
71 (2009) (“Next to churches, prisons were the most important public buildings in the metropolis. . . . 
[T]heir even greater importance to the body politic demanded that prisons be rebuilt before the churches 
or almost any other public institution after the Great Fire.”). 
 166 Ware, supra note 160, at 352; see also White, supra note 165 (detailing the wretched living 
conditions inside Marshalsea, a prison notorious for poor treatment of debtors). 
 167 Kercher, supra note 163, at 64. 
 168 White, supra note 165, at 82–83. 
 169 Id. at 69. 
 170 Id. 
 171 Cohen, supra note 158, at 154. 
 172 Richard Ford, Imprisonment for Debt, 25 MICH. L. REV. 24, 27 (1926). 
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sentences in the very same prisons as innocent debtors.173 Frequently, debtors 
were treated far worse than actual criminals.174 
Compassionate humanitarians and evangelicals campaigned for reform 
and abolition, believing that lengthy prison stays under horrific conditions 
confused innocent debtors with guilty criminals. An eighteenth century 
philanthropist released a report on the state of prisons, drawing public 
attention to imprisoned debtors, “the most pitiable objects in our gaols 
[jails].”175 In response, prisoner welfare charities assisted “innocent” debtors, 
working to secure their releases.176 One notable such charity was the 
Thatched House Society. This charity focused on obtaining the release of 
“petty-sum” debtors, and was successful in liberating over 15,000 debtors in 
the last quarter of the eighteenth century.177 Another such compassionate 
charity succeeded in releasing tens of thousands of imprisoned debtors, 
demonstrating that “social opinion was outraged by [imprisonment for debt] 
and there was public clamor for reform.”178 
The issue soon percolated through the halls of government. As early as 
1790, some members of the House of Commons “felt that it was a disgrace 
to have imprisonment for debt in a civilised nation, the true law of the land 
having been perverted by practice.”179 Over the ensuing decades, various 
British governmental committees studied the issue of imprisonment for 
private debts.180 
Parliament then engaged in a series of debates on the issue, articulating 
their reasons for abolishing imprisonment for debt.181 British lawmakers who 
sought reform focused on how this system confused innocent debtors—
imprisoned due to misfortune, exploitation by creditors, or simply poverty—
with guilty criminals. During debate on the Debtors Act of 1869, one 
Member of Parliament reflected this sentiment, insisting that “the man who 
 
 173 White, supra note 165, at 71. 
 174 Kercher, supra note 163, at 67. 
 175 Id. at 62 (“Howard’s were the first and most important of many revelations of prison conditions, 
which were to raise awareness about civil prisoners. That awareness [fueled] the abolition campaigns.”). 
 176 Id. 
 177 Cohen, supra note 158, at 163. This society went so far as to work with a debtor’s creditor to 
release the debtor from existing liability as well. Id. 
 178 Ware, supra note 160, at 353 (quoting a 1969 government report on the issue). 
 179 Kercher, supra note 163, at 66. 
 180 Id. at 74–93. 
 181 It is important to note that reform- and abolition-minded Victorians made a wide array of 
arguments for change, including constitutional arguments, utilitarian arguments, and, as this Note 
emphasizes, humanitarian and fairness arguments. Id. at 62–74. Commercial and aristocratic interests 
remained a powerful roadblock to reform. Id. at 66–67. 
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was merely unfortunate should not be regarded or treated as a criminal.”182 
Another lawmaker argued that the practice of imprisoning debtors 
“confounded the innocent with the guilty.”183 They squarely addressed the 
legal fiction underpinning this entire system: “[T]he plea here that the 
imprisonment was not for debt but for contempt of Court was a transparent 
fiction.”184 Debtors, they thought, were not really being detained for 
contempt, but punished for debt, “for penal imprisonment it was.”185 
Parliament thus passed the Debtors Act of 1869, which largely abolished 
imprisonment of debtors. The Act provided that “no person shall be arrested 
or imprisoned for making default in payment of a sum of money.”186 
Parliament did, however, retain one exception to the general abolition of 
imprisonment for debtors: Section 5 of the Act retained imprisonment for 
debtors who had the resources to pay but nevertheless refused.187 
Then, as now, civil detention in a state prison facility improperly 
conflated civil with criminal law. Although civil detention of migrants is 
ostensibly a form of civil detention, the legal fiction is unconvincing. In civil 
detention of migrants, as in Victorian debtors’ prisons, the state uses 
government facilities to detain (imprison) migrants for lengthy, 188 sometimes 
indefinite, periods of time. In both types of detention, state resources are used 
to restrict the liberty of competent people who are not being detained for 
having committed a crime, but for breaking a civil statute.189 In neither case 
is there an inquiry into why the person meets the standard for confinement, 
only that they do meet that standard.190 Even the conditions in certain 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) facilities could easily be confused 
 
 182 P.E. Rock, Civil Debtors: The Report of the Payne Committee, 9 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 398, 399 
(1969). 
 183 194 Parl Deb HC (3d ser.) (1869) col. 776. 
 184 197 Parl Deb HC (3d ser.) (1869) col. 572. 
 185 197 Parl Deb HC (3d ser.) (1869) col. 421. 
 186 Debtors Act 1869, 32 & 33 Vict. c. 62 (Eng.). 
 187 Id. (providing that courts may imprison debtors “for a term not exceeding six weeks, or until 
payment of the sum due . . . [p]rovided . . . that the person making default either has or has had since the 
date of the order or judgment the means to pay the sum”). 
 188 Compare Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 860–61 (2018) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing 
statistics on migrants being detained for years on end without a bond hearing), with supra notes 163–164 
and accompanying text. 
 189 Compare Lutz, supra note 14 (noting that the mandatory detention statutes apply even to migrants 
who have not been charged with a crime, such as asylum seekers), with Cohen, supra note 158, at 155 
(detailing the technically noncriminal nature of imprisonment for debt). 
 190 See generally Jennings, 138 S. Ct. 830 (holding that §§ 1225(b), 1226(a), and 1226(c) do not 
afford detained migrants the right to periodic bond hearings). 
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with those of Victorian debtors’ prisons,191 and these conditions are not 
themselves aimed at rectifying the reason for which the person is being 
detained. And most importantly, in neither situation is there any real 
possibility of alleviating the confinement, since the conditions for release 
cannot always be met.192 
B. Involuntary Civil Commitment in the Substance Abuse Crisis 
There is another category of civil detention that provides an instructive 
analogy to the civil detention of migrants: civil commitment of individuals 
suffering from addiction or mental illness. As the opioid crisis deepens, civil 
commitment has become a more pronounced and controversial policy 
response. Individuals with Substance Use Disorder (SUD) may be 
involuntarily committed and hospitalized. Thirty-seven states and the 
District of Columbia have civil commitment laws that cover the civil 
commitment of individuals suffering from alcoholism and SUD.193 
Roughly a century of case law supplies the legal foundation for 
involuntary civil commitment. As early as 1905, the Supreme Court held that 
the states may use their police powers to abridge individual autonomy in 
order to protect the health and safety of citizens.194 Decades later, the 
Supreme Court decided Robinson v. California, a case in which a defendant 
was arrested and sentenced to jail time for violating a state statute that made 
it a crime to be addicted to narcotics.195 Although the Court ruled that a state 
cannot criminalize the status of drug addiction, a state may effectuate 
“involuntary confinement” treatment programs “in the interest of the general 
health and welfare” of the public.196 The Court’s subsequent ruling in 
 
 191 Compare Dickerson, supra note 27, with 195 Parl Deb HC (3d ser.) (1869) col. 173 (“In White 
cross Street Prison . . . the County Court debtors were imprisoned in something like the cages for wild 
beasts at the Zoological Gardens . . . .”), and White, supra note 165, at 69 (detailing the conditions of 
debtors’ prisons). 
 192 Debtors languished in prison for years if they could not afford to pay their debt. See Ware, supra 
note 160, at 355 (differentiating between recalcitrant debtors who could refuse to pay their debt with poor 
debtors who truly could not afford to). Likewise, detention is mandatory under the immigration 
provisions, and there are limited ways that a migrant can be released from detention. See Transcript of 
Oral Argument at 24–25, Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830 (2018) (No. 15-1204). At oral argument, 
counsel for the government conceded that options for release are limited and caused laughter in the 
courtroom after suggesting that a detained migrant “always has the option of terminating the detention by 
accepting a final order of removal and returning home.” 
 193 Ish P. Bhalla et al., The Role of Civil Commitment in the Opioid Crisis, 46 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 
343, 343 (2018). 
 194 Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 25 (1905). 
 195 370 U.S. 660, 666 (1962). 
 196 Id. at 664–65. 
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O’Connor v. Donaldson imposes two requirements on such involuntary 
confinement programs: the involuntarily confined individual must be 
dangerous to himself or others, or must be incapable of caring for his own 
needs by himself or with the help of friends and family.197 That is, the state 
cannot civilly commit an individual suffering from substance abuse or 
mental illness unless they have to. 
Involuntary civil commitment laws vary by jurisdiction, but they share 
substantial similarities in the legal process leading up to involuntary civil 
commitment. Generally, a medical professional must examine the individual 
and certify in writing that the individual requires intensive treatment for his 
or her condition.198 Typically, a showing must be made that the individual is 
gravely disabled, dangerous to himself or others, incapacitated, unable to 
manage his personal affairs and basic needs, or that the individual is 
suffering from a “loss of control.”199 Family members are the most common 
petitioners.200 Lastly, due process considerations demand that the committed 
individual receive a judicial hearing within a short period of time after being 
committed in order to contest the commitment.201 Taken together, this body 
of law undergirds the constitutional status of state civil commitment laws in 
the United States.202 
This abridgment of individual autonomy is considered civil, not 
criminal.203 When the state commits someone for substance abuse issues, it 
does so for the purpose of “provid[ing] the individual with treatment, not 
punishment.”204 Although no two state civil commitment laws are identical, 
 
 197 422 U.S. 563, 576 (1975). 
 198 NAT’L JUDICIAL OPIOID TASK FORCE, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, INVOLUNTARY 
COMMITMENT AND GUARDIANSHIP LAWS FOR PERSONS WITH A SUBSTANCE USE DISORDER 1 (2018), 
https://www.ncsc.org/~/media/4EC4A03001EB4E5BB5F649FE2D4F7802.ashx 
[https://perma.cc/A6SX-8VDX]. 
 199 Id. 
 200 Bhalla et al., supra note 193, at 345. 
 201 See Logan v. Arafeh, 346 F. Supp. 1265, 1269 (D. Conn. 1972), aff’d sub nom. Briggs v. Arafeh 
411 U.S. 911 (1973). 
 202 For a detailed overview of case law on this subject, see Heather Gray, Constitutional 
Considerations of Involuntary Commitment for Substance Use Disorder and Alcoholism, NAMSDL 
NEWS (Sept. 21, 2016), https://namsdl.org/wp-content/uploads/NAMSDL-News-September-21-
2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/QW9Z-G9K7].  
 203 Because such detention is civil, rather than criminal, the Supreme Court has held that individuals 
subjected to involuntary civil detention for medical treatment “are entitled to more considerate treatment 
and conditions of confinement than criminals whose conditions of confinement are designed to punish.” 
Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 321–22 (1982). 
 204 Thomas L. Hafemeister & Ali John Amirshahi, Civil Commitment for Drug Dependency: The 
Judicial Response, 26 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 39, 47 (1992) (citing Donahue v. R.I. Dep’t of Mental Health, 
632 F. Supp. 1456, 1462 (D.R.I. 1986)). 
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they generally specify that the purpose of involuntary civil commitment is to 
ensure that the individual receives the medical treatment he or she needs.205 
The length of time that an individual may be involuntarily committed 
for treatment varies, ranging from three days to one year.206 Importantly, 
though, many state civil commitment laws have a maximum time limit for 
involuntary civil commitment.207 This raises the question: what happens 
when a medical professional believes that an individual is in need of further 
treatment, but the statutory time limit for civil commitment has been 
reached? Several jurisdictions permit the state to keep the individual detained 
in civil commitment if a court orders that additional treatment is necessary.208 
Many do not, permitting the individual to leave civil commitment even if he 
or she still suffers from substance abuse or mental health issues.209 
Like involuntary hospitalization statutes, mandatory migrant detention 
statutes are, on paper, civil. But analogizing migrant detention to involuntary 
hospitalization reveals significant differences. The extent of state 
involvement is a telling feature. Whereas migrant detention involves 
significant state resources to detain and house migrants for long periods of 
time, involuntary hospitalization involves the state only for procedural 
issues.210 This also speaks to the physical reality of the detention: migrants 
are detained in DHS jails, whereas individuals suffering from substance 
abuse are committed to hospitals. The former, closely resembling actual 
criminal incarceration, is a far cry from the latter, which amounts to medical 
care. 
Furthermore, the purpose for the detention is another instructive 
touchpoint of this analogy. State civil commitment laws exist “to provide the 
 
 205 See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 123, § 35 (2018) (stating that the civil commitment “shall be for 
the purpose of inpatient care for the treatment of an alcohol or substance use disorder in a facility licensed 
or approved by the department of public health or the department of mental health”); VA. CODE ANN. 
§ 37.2-809 (2016) (specifying that a medical professional must assert that the individual “is in need of 
hospitalization or treatment” for such a petition to be granted); see also John E.B. Myers, Involuntary 
Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill: A System in Need of Change, 29 VILL. L. REV. 367, 401 (1984) 
(“[T]he governmental purposes are the protection of society and the provision of treatment designed to 
alleviate suffering and return the patient to a fulfilling life in the community.”). 
 206 NAT’L JUDICIAL OPIOID TASK FORCE, supra note 198, at 1. 
 207 HAZELDEN BETTY FORD FOUND., INVOLUNTARY COMMITMENT FOR SUBSTANCE USE 
DISORDERS (2017), https://www.hazeldenbettyford.org/education/bcr/addiction-research/involuntary-
commitment-edt-717 [https://perma.cc/HD2P-UHM5]. 
 208 Id. (“After the maximum period of ‘detention’ ends, and if the court does not order additional 
treatment, individuals are released.”). 
 209 Id. 
 210 See supra notes 200–204 and accompanying text. 
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individual with treatment, not punishment,”211 and the practice of involuntary 
hospitalization is true to this purpose, with hospitals and medical staff 
providing treatment for the illness. On the contrary, although the stated 
purpose of migrant detention is custodial,212 the actual practice of migrant 
detention does not hew closely to this purpose. Migrant detention does 
accomplish this custodial goal, but it also goes far beyond it, acting as a 
performative deterrent to future migrants.213 As such, the actual purpose of 
these two forms of detention are dissimilar. 
These two subjects are also dissimilar on the standard for confinement. 
The state must clear a high bar to commit an individual to involuntary 
hospitalization.214 This standard is clearly civil in nature because the state is 
only looking to permit such hospitalization when it is in the best interests of 
the individual’s health or to address a direct and present threat to others’ 
safety. As such, the standard for confinement that renders involuntary 
hospitalization civil rather than criminal does not resemble the standard of 
confinement for migrant detention, which is an extremely low bar of merely 
asking whether the migrant falls under one of the categories identified in the 
statute.215 This standard looks to the state’s interests rather than the 
individual’s and does not allow for an individualized assessment. Thus, they 
more closely resemble criminal incarceration standards.216 
Lastly, civil commitment and migrant detention are not analogous in 
terms of length of detention and, more importantly, the process for receiving 
review. Nearly all state statutes permitting civil commitment have a 
maximum length of confinement.217 But more importantly, even in states that 
permit indefinite civil commitment, the individual may not be indefinitely 
detained without a hearing.218 This process of requiring regular hearings to 
 
 211 Hafemeister & Amirshahi, supra note 204, at 47. 
 212 Ryo, supra note 22, at 238 (“Immigration detention in the U.S. is civil confinement for which the 
officially stated purpose is to facilitate the removal of individuals who do not have permission to remain 
in the country.”). 
 213 See id. at 239. 
 214 The individual must be dangerous to himself or others or must be incapable of caring for his own 
needs with the help of family and friends. See NAT’L JUDICIAL OPIOID TASK FORCE, supra note 198, at 
1. 
 215 See Lutz, supra note 14 (identifying the categories of migrants that are subject to mandatory 
detention). 
 216 Arguably, the mandatory detention provision is worse than many provisions of the criminal 
sentencing guidelines, which, aside from provisions prescribing mandatory minimum sentences, are 
largely nonbinding guidelines that require judges to consider an individual’s criminal history and personal 
circumstances when ordering a sentence for a criminal offense. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (2012). 
 217 See NAT’L JUDICIAL OPIOID TASK FORCE, supra note 198, at 1. 
 218 HAZELDEN BETTY FORD FOUND., supra note 207. 
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authorize continued involuntary detention is exactly what migrants are 
denied. There is no process providing a migrant with periodic review or bond 
hearings under the statute, at which the migrant may challenge his or her 
detention.219 Overall, comparing the length of detention and process (or lack 
thereof) of challenging indefinite detention demonstrates that mandatory 
detention under the immigration statutes is importantly dissimilar to civil 
commitment for substance abuse or mental illness. 
Although the power of the government was and is not as plenary in 
either of the situations to which this Note analogizes as it is in American 
immigration law, the difference is less salient than it may seem. The lack of 
plenary power in these other contexts does not materially change what we 
can learn from them. This Note draws on these analogies to help modern 
readers and lawyers understand what has traditionally been considered 
permissive civil detention in Anglo-American history. Each analogy carries 
with it lessons that we can apply to modern immigration detention. The 
debtors’ prison analogy demonstrates that the length of detention, physical 
reality of detention, penal nature of detention (even if technically a 
“coercive” form of detention), and degree of government involvement beg 
the question of whether detention is truly “civil.” Likewise, the substance 
abuse analogy informs us that a time limit or process for challenging 
prolonged detention is a hallmark of civil detention, and that we should be 
mindful of whether the use of detention is tailored to its purpose—in that 
analogy, coercive detention to force individuals to seek medical attention. 
The effect of the plenary power in American immigration law is that 
courts engage in limited and highly deferential review of the actions of the 
political branches, namely the actions of the executive branch and the laws 
of Congress, but this deference will not keep the issue from the Supreme 
Court. The dissenting Justices in Jennings and Preap are prepared to address 
the constitutional issue even in light of the plenary power, and the author of 
the majority opinions in those cases—Justice Alito—has signaled that the 
Court is receptive to addressing the constitutional issue.220 Justice Thomas 
appears to be the only sitting Justice with a firm view that these statutes—
read in context of the plenary power—largely preclude judicial review of 
immigration decisions.221 This Note now turns to an examination of where 
 
 219 Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 844 (2018) (“[N]either provision can reasonably be read 
to limit detention to six months.”). 
 220 See supra notes 150–152 and accompanying text. 
 221 Daniel L. Kaplan, Neil Gorsuch: A Preliminary Assessment, 33 CRIM. JUST. 27, 28 (2019) (noting 
that in Jennings v. Rodriguez, “Justice Gorsuch joined Justice Thomas’s concurrence expressing the view 
that the Act barred any court from taking jurisdiction to address the question . . . [b]ut . . . notably declined 
 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
1662 
the law of indefinite detention of migrants ought to develop in light of the 
Court’s jurisprudence and these analogies. 
IV. APPLICATIONS TO THE CIVIL DETENTION OF MIGRANTS 
The Supreme Court will eventually need to address the constitutionality 
of the provisions permitting indefinite civil detention of migrants.222 While 
no analogy can equip us with all of the wisdom necessary to handle the issue 
of indefinite detention of migrants, the analogies in Part III impart lessons 
that transcend time and context—lessons that help us grapple with the 
permissiveness of the mandatory detention provisions of American 
immigration law. 
From the above analogies, this Note has identified four features central 
to the inquiry of distinguishing civil from criminal detention: (1) length of 
detention; (2) level of government involvement in detention; (3) physical 
reality of detention; and, most importantly, (4) purpose of detention. In 
scrutinizing these features of detention in the American immigration context, 
this Note argues that these four features turn a difference in degree into a 
difference in kind, rendering the indefinite civil detention of migrants 
functionally criminal detention. The Supreme Court has made such 
functional findings before, ruling that “though [some statutes] may be civil 
in form, [they] are in their nature criminal.”223 It should do so again. 
It is true that the Supreme Court has addressed the difference between 
civil and criminal detention and condoned the use of civil detention in the 
immigration context.224 A skeptical reader might therefore consider this issue 
closed. But the modern world is very different from that of Mr. Wing. It is 
unwise to blindly apply the holding of Wong Wing without considering how 
circumstances have changed since 1896. 
 
to join a footnote in which Justice Thomas hinted that the Act might contain a still more sweeping 
preclusion of judicial review of immigration decisions”). 
 222 In Preap, the Supreme Court acknowledged that litigants may raise a head-on constitutional 
challenge to mandatory detention provisions, reserving that question for another day. Nielsen v. Preap, 
139 S. Ct. 954, 972 (2019). Meanwhile, the dissenting opinions reached the constitutional question. 
Jennings, 138 S. Ct. at 861 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 223 See, e.g., Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634 (1886) (finding that a civil state statute was 
functionally a criminal statute because it compelled the production of an individual’s private papers and 
records to the government in order to establish a criminal charge, constituting an unreasonable search and 
seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment). 
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The Court in Wong Wing thought “it clear that [civil] detention, or 
temporary confinement,” in order to effectuate removal is valid.225 In that 
case, however, the challenged statute actually contained a time limit of one 
year.226 The modern mandatory civil detention statutes contain no such time 
limit.227 Unlike Mr. Wing, whose civil detention would certainly terminate 
after one year, migrants subjected to the modern mandatory detention 
provisions face much lengthier, indefinite terms of detention.228 It is time for 
a fresh look at whether these provisions truly create civil, not criminal, 
detentions. 
Beginning with the first feature—length of detention—the criminal 
nature of these provisions is most obviously gleaned from their lack of time 
limits and process for challenging indefinite detention. One of the primary 
lessons learned from the study of debtors’ prisons is that if detention is to be 
civil, it demands a time limit. English debtors were consigned to detention 
indefinitely, detained (ostensibly by their creditors) until they agreed to pay 
the debt. Due to their inability or unwillingness to pay their debts, English 
debtors faced indefinite detention.229 In contrast, the detention of individuals 
suffering from addiction or mental illness requires a built-in time limit for 
detention to truly be “civil.” Many state statutes permitting civil commitment 
for substance abuse include a time limit on detention.230 Furthermore, unlike 
the debtors’ laws of Victorian England, current state civil commitment laws 
that permit indefinite hospitalization beyond the statutory maximum 
prescribe process that affords the hospitalized individual with periodic 
hearings to challenge the prolonged hospitalization.231 
Indefinite detention of migrants is more closely analogous to detention 
for debt than to the civil commitment of individuals suffering from addiction 
 
 225 Id. at 235. 
 226 “That any such Chinese person or person of Chinese descent convicted and adjudged to be not 
lawfully entitled to be or remain in the United States shall be imprisoned at hard labor for a period of not 
exceeding one year and thereafter removed from the United States, as hereinbefore provided.” Act of 
May 5, 1892, ch. 60, § 4, 27 Stat. 25, 25 (emphasis added) (repealed 1943). 
 227 See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(b), 1226(a), 1226(c) (2012). 
 228 Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 860 (2018) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“The record shows 
that the Government detained some asylum seekers for 831 days (nearly 2 & [a half] years), 512 days, 
456 days, 421 days, 354 days, 319 days, 318 days, and 274 days—before they won their cases and 
received asylum. It also shows that the Government detained one noncitizen for nearly four years after 
he had finished serving a criminal sentence, and the Government detained other members of this class for 
608 days, 561 days, 446 days, 438 days, 387 days, and 305 days—all before they won their cases and 
received relief from removal.” (citations omitted)). 
 229 See Kercher, supra note 163. 
 230 See supra note 209 and accompanying text. 
 231 See Jennings, 138 S. Ct. at 864 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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or mental illness. Regarding length of detention, Justice Breyer observed that 
the government detained some migrants for years before they eventually won 
their cases.232 The government even detained one migrant for nearly four 
years after he had finished serving a criminal sentence.233 And regarding the 
process for periodic review of indefinite detention, the Court in Jennings 
expressly held that the mandatory detention provisions cannot be read in a 
manner that permits such periodic review.234 On this feature, migrant 
detention is more closely analogous to imprisonment for debt than 
involuntary hospitalization, and the Supreme Court should look to the history 
of debtors’ prisons for guidance.235 
Thus, at a minimum, civil detention requires periodic review, and 
should more generally require a firm end point unless the government can 
show that continued detention is necessary and provide the detained 
individual with periodic hearings to challenge the detention. Scholars and 
amici who support the mandatory detention provisions as “civil” statutes 
misunderstand this. Writing in support of the government in Jennings, amici 
contended that “[d]etention pending completion of removal proceedings 
always has an identifiable endpoint.”236 But this is no more true now than it 
was for Mr. Mezei.237 Mr. Rodriguez, the subject of the class action who had 
been detained for three years under the INA provisions before finally filing 
a habeas petition, would surely say otherwise.238 As would Mr. Mezei, who 
would have spent the rest of his life languishing in indefinite detention on 
Ellis Island but for the good graces of President Eisenhower.239 
History informs us that detention without a time limit or process for 
periodic hearings to challenge prolonged detention is “penal 
imprisonment.”240 In some instances, indefinite detention under the 
mandatory detention provisions is a fate perhaps even worse than a criminal 
 
 232 Id. at 860. 
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sentence.241 Defendants convicted of a crime stand before a judge who reads 
them their sentence.242 Before they even begin technically serving their term 
of imprisonment, they are given notice of the maximum term for which they 
will be imprisoned.243 That is not the case for migrants detained under the 
mandatory detention provisions of the INA.244 As written, the provisions of 
American immigration law authorizing the indefinite “civil” detention of 
migrants are a “transparent fiction,”245 and no amount of civil gloss—from 
Congress or the courts—can change that. Only a time limit or process 
affording periodic hearings to challenge continued detention can. Without 
such limitations, these provisions are functionally criminal. 
Second, the degree of government involvement can help us distinguish 
civil from criminal detention. Debtors’ prisons implicated an enormous 
amount of state involvement and state resources. Although the detention was 
civil on paper, the English government supplied the infrastructure for such 
confinement. The government supplied the prisons, prison guards, and all 
attending resources necessary to detain debtors.246 In contrast, the 
government is minimally involved in the confinement of individuals who 
suffer from substance abuse. The government’s involvement is limited to a 
judge assenting to a medical professional’s assessment that an individual 
must be committed to effectuate treatment.247 The individual is then 
hospitalized rather than imprisoned.248 
Thus, comparing imprisonment for debt with involuntary 
hospitalization teaches us that heavy government involvement in the 
management of detainees is an indicator that detention is not civil, but rather 
criminal. With migrant detention, the degree of government involvement and 
state resources is even greater than in debtors’ prisons. The Department of 
 
 241 Jennings, 138 S. Ct. at 865–66 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (discussing the treatment of indefinitely 
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Homeland Security supplies the detention facilities, staffs them with agents 
of the state, and supplies resources necessary to detain these migrants.249 The 
degree of government involvement in the detention of migrants is so great 
that much of the work is actually outsourced to the private sector.250 The 
degree of government involvement in the detention of migrants under the 
mandatory detention provisions is far more robust than the degree of 
government involvement in the debtors’ prisons of Victorian England.251 
Third, the physical reality of detention is helpful in discerning civil 
from criminal detention. The Court should rule that these provisions are 
functionally criminal because migrant detention centers are indistinguishable 
from prisons. Private prison corporations and county correctional 
departments operate over 70% of these detention facilities.252 As migrant 
advocates demonstrate, the facilities that incarcerate immigrants under these 
provisions operate under a penal model.253 The conditions inside are virtually 
indistinguishable from conventional prisons. Armed guards process 
immigrants, taking their clothing and belongings and issuing them a prison 
jumpsuit.254 The physical reality of debtors’ prisons is instructive on this 
point. In 1869, Members of Parliament commented extensively on the 
wretched conditions of debtors’ prisons.255 This supplied an additional reason 
for abolishing debtors’ prisons through the Debtors Act of 1869. Today’s 
Court should not avert its eyes from the reality of migrant detention centers: 
 
 249 The Department of Homeland Security touted this as one of its funding priorities, highlighting 
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if it looks like a prison, operates like a prison, and literally smells like a 
prison, the incarceration cannot be characterized as anything other than 
imprisonment.256 
To be sure, individuals suffering from substance abuse by no means 
have an easy go with involuntary hospitalization. The pain and anguish that 
accompany substance abuse—and its treatment via hospitalization—are 
real.257 Individuals suffering from substance abuse battle not only their inner 
suffering but also the physical manifestations of addiction and withdrawal, 
which in many cases can prove fatal. But this suffering is not inflicted by the 
state. This suffering is a result of the disease itself. 
Detention for any reason is uncomfortable. On this third feature—the 
physical reality of detention—the relevant question is what is inflicting that 
discomfort. Asking this question of the indefinite detention of migrants 
yields a clear answer: the United States is causing this discomfort through 
the wretched conditions of migrant detention centers. 
The fourth feature relevant to discerning civil from criminal 
detention—the purpose of detention—is the most difficult to analyze. 
Through the above analogies, this Note has examined forms of detention that 
serve specific purposes, namely custodial detention, coercive detention, and 
penal detention. The stated purpose of any given form of detention ought to 
be scrutinized. Was detention in a debtors’ prison truly a form of coercive 
detention, serving the purpose of forcing debtors to pay their debts? 
Parliament said no.258 Although detention for debt ostensibly served the 
purpose of coercion, it was functionally penal. Civil confinement for 
substance abuse is likewise muddled on this feature. Individuals suffering 
from substance abuse are involuntarily hospitalized for a purpose that is 
some mix of custody and coercion: the suffering individual needs to be 
supervised (custodial detention) and forced to undergo medical treatment 
(coercive detention). 
Indefinite detention of migrants does not map neatly onto the 
framework of custodial detention, coercive detention, or penal detention. The 
stated purpose of migrant detention is custodial: the United States detains 
migrants in order to facilitate their removal from the country.259 In reality, it 
 
 256 See Dickerson, supra note 27. 
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is also coercive: the relevant statutes mandate detention in order to force 
migrants to appear for their legal proceedings.260 
In the wake of Jennings, legal scholars have argued that migrant 
detention actually serves a penal purpose, namely the “criminalization of 
Mexican and Central American immigrants.”261 Unlike the members of 
today’s Court, Supreme Court Justices from over a century ago were more 
inclined to recognize aspects of the immigration system as penal rather than 
civil.262 In addressing the broader question of whether deportation itself is 
penal, Justice Brewer, dissenting in Fong Yue Ting, stated that “it needs no 
citation of authorities to support the proposition that deportation is 
punishment.”263 Justice Field, the creator of the plenary power doctrine, also 
dissented in Fong Yue Ting, expressing what one scholar called “outrage at 
the majority’s willingness to leave whatever constitutional protections a 
noncitizen might hold to the whims of the political branches of 
government.”264 To be sure, Justices Brewer and Field did not live in a world 
of robust detention of migrants. Fong Yue Ting was not decided against the 
backdrop of thousands of noncitizens subjected to indefinite detention. But 
given these Justices’ conviction that deportation is a criminal punishment, a 
modern reader might infer that their reasoning (and outrage) would likewise 
apply to the widespread indefinite detention of migrants. Detention to 
facilitate punishment should itself be understood to be punishment. Sadly, 
the proposition that deportation and migrant detention serve a penal purpose 
is in retreat. As the same scholar notes, Justice Breyer’s dissenting opinions 
in Jennings and Preap do “not go[] so far as to argue that detention and 
deportation are a form of punishment,” as his nineteenth century 
predecessors did.265 
Although that proposition is in retreat, this Note argues that it is true: 
migrant detention serves a penal purpose, and is therefore punishment, which 
renders it criminal rather than civil. As far back as Wong Wing v. United 
States, the Supreme Court has recognized that immigration detention may 
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not be used for penal purposes.266 This pronouncement continued through to 
recent cases, such as Zadvydas and Demore, in which the Court assumed that 
the indefinite detention provisions “are nonpunitive in purpose and effect,”267 
and upheld one such provision “on the basis of its non-punitive purposes.”268 
These assumptions are wrong. Contrary to the Supreme Court’s assumptions, 
these provisions are punitive in nature because “imposing mandatory 
detention appears to have little purpose but to punish an individual on the 
basis of a crime for which she has already served her criminal sentence—an 
outcome that would be difficult or impossible to reconcile with the 
commands of the Constitution.”269 Functionally, these provisions impose 
mandatory detention without trial by jury and other constitutional 
protections. 
This Note also finds that migrant detention serves a fourth purpose 
which may be far more perverse than custodial, coercive, or penal detention: 
theatrical detention.270 The President has weaponized migrant detention for 
political profit and general migration deterrence. In August of 2019, the 
Trump Administration unveiled a new regulation to replace the Flores 
Settlement, which was an agreement between the Clinton Administration 
and immigration activists that mandated a minimum level of care for migrant 
children and placed a limit on how long the government could detain them.271 
The New York Times reports that “[t]he administration’s goal with the new 
rule is deterrence, and its message to families fleeing Central America is 
blunt: Come here and we will lock you up.”272 President Trump stated this 
himself, remarking that his Administration’s zero-tolerance policy is coming 
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together “like[] a beautiful puzzle.”273 Migrant detention is no longer merely 
custodial, coercive, and penal—it is performative. “[W]hen they see you 
can’t get into the United States,” or what happens upon arrival, the President 
will have accomplished his goal of using migrant detention as a general 
deterrent against future migrants.274 The message is clear: the drawbridge is 
up, the country is closed, and if a migrant still manages to enter the United 
States, they will languish away in migrant detention.275 
In calling for the Court to recognize the mandatory detention provisions 
as functionally criminal, this Note appears to be calling for a radical 
departure from case law. But in light of the features underlying the Court’s 
past decisions in this area, it is not so radical as it seems. While the Court 
has continued to assume such detentions are civil, it has not meaningfully 
analyzed how the circumstances and realities of modern immigration 
detention affect this label.276 And even if the Supreme Court continues to 
read these provisions as civil provisions, the above analogies are still helpful 
in understanding the permissiveness of civil detention. 
CONCLUSION 
This Note traces the history of the regulation of immigration in the 
United States and the current civil detention regime in American 
immigration law. In doing so, this Note examines the evolution of the plenary 
power. With Jennings and Preap, the Supreme Court has had two 
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has grown indistinct.”). 
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opportunities to rule on the indefinite civil detention of migrants since the 
beginning of the Trump Administration. As the practice of indefinite civil 
detention becomes more pronounced, the Supreme Court will eventually 
need to weigh in on the constitutionality of this facet of American 
immigration law. Two analogies—debtors’ prisons in early modern England 
and involuntary civil commitment of individuals suffering from substance 
abuse—provide both historical and modern perspectives on the 
permissiveness of civil detention. Drawing on history and function, this Note 
has argued that the Supreme Court should rule that the mandatory detention 
provisions are functionally criminal, despite their civil label. While such a 
ruling would not be without precedent,277 it is a tall order in light of the 
centuries of case law treating these detention provisions as civil provisions 
and denying migrants the right to a bond hearing. 
In exploring this civil/criminal distinction, this Note has sought to tell 
the stories of those affected by civil detention, who have been treated like 
criminals without any of the attending rights of the criminally accused. Two 
years into his detention on Ellis Island, Ignatz Mezei penned a short letter to 
a federal judge in New York. “Let me go free,” he pleaded. “I did not kill 
anybody, I did not steal anybody, I did not make any crime.”278 It is time for 
the Supreme Court to answer his plea. 
  
 
 277 See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886). 
 278 Serrano, supra note 12. 
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